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Do Pluralist Power Structures Enhance Involvement in Decision-Making by
Nongovernmental Organizations?
Simon H. Okoth
Zayed University
Abstract: Previous studies conducted in the United States show that pluralist power structures
lead to greater involvement by organized groups in issue-areas that affect communities. Given
that pluralism is a procedural theory, broad stakeholder involvement thus depends on the
effectiveness of the power structures. This article uses the Nile Basin Initiative project in
Ethiopia, as case study, to explore the extent to which the presence or absence of pluralist
structures influence involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders in the decision processes that
affect shared water use. Analyses of qualitative data show that while theoretically the presence
of pluralist power structures broadens stakeholder involvement, in practice it is not a sufficient
condition. It is further observed that despite certain similarities in the way pluralism is defined
and structured, the manner in which the pluralist power structures function depend on the
degree of democratic openness at any given time and context.
Keywords: Pluralism, power structures, decision-making, Nile Basin Initiative, Ethiopia

Introduction

This article explores the reasons why involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders in the decision
making processes of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been missing in Ethiopia. A number of
theories such as Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Olson 1965), Advocacy
Coalition Framework (Ostrom 1990) and Pluralism (Dahl 1961) have guided researchers to better
understand the degree of stakeholder involvement in public matters that affect their well-being. The
pluralist theory, in particular, has been applied to analyze whether the presence or absence of pluralist
power structures influence the level of stakeholder involvement. Some of those who have employed
this theoretical approach includes Floyd Hunter (1963), Robert Dahl (1961), Wallace Sayre and
Herbert Kaufman (1960), Aaron Wildavsky (1964), and Nelson Wikstrom (1993). Such studies have
confirmed that pluralist power structures increase broad level of stakeholder involvement (Wildavsky
1964; Olsen 1982; Yishai 1990; Mattila 1994; McCool 1995).
Given that pluralism is a procedural theory rooted in Western democracies, this article
explores whether the presence or absence of pluralist power structures explain the degree of
stakeholder involvement in a developing country context. In this regard, the Nile Basin Initiative‘s
Water Resources Planning and Management project in Ethiopia is used as a Case study. The article
proceeds as follows: First, a statement of the problem is presented by examining the Nile Basin
Initiative, its functions, and expectations. It further highlights the historical events leading to its
formation before posing the research questions. The second part of the article explicates the pluralist
theory and how pluralist power structures can be used to assess the degree of stakeholder
involvement. The third part presents the study method. The fourth discusses the findings, followed
by discussion of those findings in part five. The sixth presents the conclusion.
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Problem Statement
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), temporary water compact signed in 1999 by ten African countries
(i.e., Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic
Republic of Congo) that share the River Nile basin, was created to enable the member states to share
in the socio-economic benefits through joint projects (World Bank 2003). Driven by international
experience that joint investment projects by riparian nations can reduce potential conflicts, the ten
Nile Basin countries launched eight of the following projects: Applied Training Project, the Nile
Trans-boundary Environmental Action Project, the Nile Basin Power Trade, the Efficient Water Use
for Agricultural Production Project, the Confidence-Building and Stakeholder Improvement Project,
Socio-Economic Development and Benefit Sharing Project, the Shared Vision Program Coordination
Project, and Water Resources Planning and Management Project (Nile Council of Ministers 2001).
For the projects to be successfully implemented and for the benefits to accrue, involvement by
nongovernmental stakeholders was considered essential. Relevant studies from around the world
show that such involvement enhances stakeholder trust and support for international water agencies
charged with overseeing shared water projects (Bell and Jansky 2005; Bruch et al. 2005). Similarly,
involvement by nongovernmental stakeholders adds value to decisions because of the grassroots
information that they bring to the table (Creighton 2005).
After more than a decade of its operations, the NBI is today caught up in a cycle of
challenges that inhibit the success of its activities. Foremost is the low level of involvement by
nongovernmental stakeholders in the decisions that affect the design and implementation of the
regional projects. According to the World Bank (2003), charged with providing technical assistance
to the NBI, without NGO involvement the projects will fail. Therefore, to enhance stakeholder
involvement, support, and basin-wide ownership of the NBI programs, the Confidence Building and
Stakeholder Involvement Project was initiated. The project employs public information and
confidence building activities across all the member states (World Bank 2003).
Another challenge is the transnational nature of the water agency and how to ensure that
those who have the interest can fully engage in the decision processes. Similarly, the different
cultures, national political dynamics, history of involvement in individual countries, economic
opportunities, and varied social values also pose the challenge to ensuring stakeholder involvement.
Furthermore, the suspicion of organized groups by the governments create unnecessary rift between
these two bodies that ought to be partners in development. For example, such rifts existed in Egypt
and Ethiopia during the most recent leaderships of Hosni Mubarak and Meles Zenawi respectively
(Nile Basin Discourse 2008). The level of suspicion has thus led some NGO representatives to assert
that the Nile Basin Initiative operates in secrecy, thus limiting the space for stakeholder involvement
(Kameri-Mbote 2005).
The history of stakeholder involvement in the Nile water compact can be traced back to the
colonial period. In an attempt to ensure uninterrupted flow of the Nile waters into Egypt and the
Sudan, the British colonial government signed two water agreements. The first was the 1929 Nile
Waters Agreement signed between Egypt and the British government; the latter acting on behalf of
Sudan and other upstream colonies in East Africa (Okidi 1994; Collins 2002; Tvedt 2004). Under
that agreement Egypt allocated herself 48 billion cubic meters of the Nile waters and Sudan 4 billion
cubic meters. In the revised 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt
apportioned herself 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters (Helal 2012, 17).
The problems with the two agreements were that they did not involve other riparian nations. Thus
the agreements failed to recognize the desirability of pluralism as a model to bringing stakeholders to
the negotiating table. Additionally, the interests of upstream states were not considered since they
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did receive any water allocation (Dinar and Alemu 2000; Klare 2001; Tvedt 2004). Moreover, other
basin countries were not permitted to use the Nile headwaters for any project without the approval by
Egypt (Collins 2002).
The issue of Nile water rights almost brought Egypt and Ethiopia close to war in 1978 when
President Sadat of Egypt threatened President Mengitsu of Ethiopia for planning to build a dam on
the Blue Nile tributary (Collins 2002). Egypt, at the end of the pipe, depends entirely on this water
source for its livelihood, hence it is feared that the construction of such a dam would reduce the
amount of water that reaches Egypt. Ethiopia, in the upstream, contributes 86 percent of the total
water flow into the Nile and yet consumes only 1 percent from the Blue Nile, a major tributary
emanating from within its territory (Okidi 1994; Collins 2002). Given the high stakes, and the fact
that for a long time Ethiopia has attempted to construct dams to generate power and to irrigate
farmlands, one would hope that the country‘s Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) take the
center stage in the matters affecting Nile water use. Unfortunately, according to the World Bank and
the Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat, that involvement has been missing (World Bank 2003). This
study attempts to explore why this has been so in Ethiopia. Hence the following research questions
are explored:
1) What are the characteristics of the power structures of the Nile Basin Initiative as they relate
to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia?
2) For those not involved in the decision-making process, what constraints prevent them from
getting a „seat at the table?”
3) Do the power structure characteristics in Ethiopia relate to pluralism and, if so, how?
4) To what extent are conditions in Ethiopia compatible with the prerequisites of pluralism?
To answer these research questions, the existence and the characteristics of pluralist power
structures in the Nile Basin Initiative and Ethiopia are analyzed, including the extent to which the
conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with the prerequisites of pluralism. In addition to the power
structures, Rational Decision Making Model is analyzed to understand the stages of decision-making
in which Ethiopia‘s NGO representatives are either included or left out within the existing NBI
power structures.
Theoretical Frameworks
Understanding stakeholder involvement in public issues continues to attract a broad body of literature
as well as theoretical frameworks. The application of theories to explain, analyze and to predict a
phenomena is by and large determined by its social, economic or political dimensions and the
practicality of the theory to provide a more robust explanation compared to the others. For example,
theoretical frameworks such as the Institutional Analysis and Development (Olson 1965), Advocacy
Coalition Framework (Ostrom 1990), and Pluralist Theory (Dahl 1961) have found relevance in the
analysis of stakeholder involvement in the decisions that affect water rights. Each of these theories is
briefly explained below.
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD)
The IAD provides a conceptual map that allows for the identification of an action arena in order ―to
analyze, predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements‖ (Ostrom 2007, 28). Ostrom
goes on to suggest that Action arenas ―include an action situation and the actors in that situation‖
(28). An Action situation includes participants, positions, outcomes, action-outcome linkages, the
control that participants exercise, information, and the costs and benefits assigned to outcomes, while
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the Actors in the situation embodies ―the resources that an actor brings to a situation; the valuation
actors assign to states of the world and to actions; the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use
knowledge contingencies and information; and the processes actors use for selection of particular
course of action‖ (Ostrom 2007, 28). The framework can be employed to determine who, among the
stakeholders, is eligible for involvement in the policymaking process, including the rules of that
guide that activity.
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
This theoretical framework was developed by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) to help understand
the complex policy processes that involve conflicts over goals, technical disputes, and the role that
multiple actors and science and technology play in the determination of policy outcomes. At the core
of the ACF are five assumptions: First, policymaking takes place at the subsystem level (i.e.,
government agencies, judicial institutions, scientists and research community, consultants, interest
groups, and the media). The subsystem coalitions occur because, in the words of Alexis de
Tocqueville (1835), they enable people with unlike minds but with unified interest to confront
complex issues such as water rights. Moreover, it is only through this type of synergy that the
coalition can hope to make significant influence on matters affecting their interests.
The other assumption is an individual member of a coalition is primarily driven by a
normative belief system, rather than by rational self-interest (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). This
implies that advocacy coalitions have the tendency to defer to the heuristics to guide policymaking.
Moreover, the belief systems tend to be stable over time therefore the ideal policy change should
minimally take place 10 years or more. The third assumption holds that it is through scientific
research and information technology that the normative beliefs among coalition participants can be
modified, hence the importance of including researchers and consultants into the policymaking.
Despite its usefulness in the assessment of the degree of coalition involvement in the policy
process, the framework has been criticized for assuming that any advocacy coalition will marshal
their way through regardless of restrictive political conditions. Besides, such subsystems, at least in
developing countries, tend to be weak given the lack of capacity and strenuous relationships with
governments (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). Another criticism of the ACF is the belief that
multiple decision venues, akin to the American pluralist structures, will guarantee involvement in
policy decisions. Not only that, another strand of argument that points to the weakness of both IAD
and ACF is provided by Ostrom (Schlager 2007). According to Ostrom, ―Frameworks organize
inquiry, but they cannot in and of themselves provide explanations for, or predictions of, behavior
and outcomes. Explanation and prediction lie in the realm of theories and models‖ (2007, 293).
These limitations provide the rationale to apply the Pluralist Theory and the Rational Decision Model
to this study.
Pluralism and Stakeholder Involvement
Pluralism is based on the notion that in any representative democracy, power is distributed equally
between organized groups and that these groups will compete for resources with which to influence
policy decisions (Presthus 1964; Dahl 1967). In this article, power is understood to mean ―political
space‖ or legal authority accorded public officials and organized groups in the decision-making
processes affecting issue-areas in the community or within organizations. In an ideal contemporary
democracy, political space is generally provided through diffused power structures and participatory
practices (Dahl 1989). Under a strict pluralist model, power structures that provide avenues for
broad citizen involvement include decentralization, representation, autonomy, mediation, procedures,
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and involvement mechanisms (Wildavsky 1964; DeLeon 1993; Bowler and Hanneman 2006).
When these structures are in place, benefits such as citizen support, trust, and legitimacy of public
programs are enhanced (Sabatier et al. 2005). However, when structures such as centralization and
bureaucratization (i.e., rules, procedures, and hierarchies) dominate, mistrust or even conflicts can
result (Bruch et al. 2005; Edelenbos and Klijn 2005). While political theorists, including Alexis de
Tocqueville (1835), have contended that pluralist structures are the most critical variable to ensuring
broad-based involvement, others in the same school of thought have asserted that greater
involvement is only possible when such structures function well (C. J. Fox, personal communication,
September 10, 2007). In essence, pluralist structure is not a sufficient condition for greater
stakeholder involvement. In fact, Theodore Lowi (1979) has argued that pluralism, and by extension
diffused structures, can inhibit broad involvement because there is a tendency for the most influential
associations to act in oligopolistic manner. Lowi adds that plural structures act to slow down the
decision process and thereby compromises efficiency of the process or even the outcome.
Despite Lowi‘s views, separate studies by Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960),
Robert Dahl (1961), and Aaron Wildavsky (1964) have confirmed that pluralist power structures
leads to greater stakeholder involvement in community issue-areas compared to elitist ones. This
article replicates the approach used by these researchers in order to establish the links between two
major variables: ―pluralist structures‖ (Independent Variable) and ―greater stakeholder involvement‖
(Dependent Variable) in relation to the NBI‘s Water Resources Planning and Management Project
(WRPM) in Ethiopia.
Rational Decision-Making Model
Rational decision-making model is incorporated as one of the analytical lens through which
involvement in different stages of decision-making can be understood. Three reasons justify the
model‘s inclusion. First, the model‘s decision stages, including identification of goals, developing
alternative solutions, implementing program solutions, and evaluating outcomes, provide systematic
means to analyzing the areas in which involvement by various actors can occur. Second, despite the
criticisms labeled against the model such as the difficulty of amassing all the information to assess
policy alternatives and to select the most optimum decision, this approach and its decision procedures
are frequently used to support political processes (Denis et al. 2006). Third, in a bureaucratic
institution such as the NBI, which is also a politically instituted body, the model is assumed to be the
modus operandi for making decisions. Therefore, the NBI is presumed to have some elements of the
rational approach at the bureaucratic level and pluralist ones at the political level. Furthermore, the
blending of the two theoretical models is anchored on previous studies that have linked pluralism and
decision-making capacity and outcomes (Underdal 1973). Hence the integrated framework (Figure
1) provides an analytical lens through which the degree of involvement by various stakeholders can
be better understood.
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Political Elites
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Agency Goals & Objectives

PLURALIST

6- Monitoring Service

THEORY

Achieve Agency/Program
Goals

3- Developing
Policy/Program Alternatives

Delivery Processes

5- Identifying Policy

4- Negotiating Agency

Implementation Strategies

Budgets

(Interest Groups)

Bureaucratic Elites

Achievement

Nongovernmental Stakeholders

2- Developing Strategies to

Constraints to Involvement

7- Evaluating
Policy/Program

Non-institutional Professional Elites
(Consultants/Donor Community)

Figure 1. Pluralism and Rational Decision-Making Conceptual Framework
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Measures of Pluralism
Two levels of measurements of pluralism are applied in this study.
1. Organizational level (Dahl cited in Newton 1969, 212; Kim and Bell 1985). The following
measures are used: representation; multiple centers of power; autonomy (of
nongovernmental organizations); and involvement mechanisms (e.g. information , meetings)
2. National Level (Lineberry and Sharkansky 1971; DeLeon 1993). The main indicator is the
presence of the ―Prerequisites of Pluralism‖ whose measures are: decentralized power
structures; heterogeneous population, large sized and autonomous NGOs, existence of strong
labor unions, diversified economy, information accessibility, and competitive party politics.
Measures of Rational Decision-Making
The measures of involvement in decision-making through the Rational Approach include the extent
to which stakeholders are invited to be part of: problem identification and defining goals and
objectives; coming up with alternative solutions; planning of project implementation; developing
monitoring procedures and part of the process; and evaluation process (Hoy and Tarter 2004).
Method of the Study
An inductive qualitative research design was employed because of the exploratory nature of the
study. This study was guided by two hypotheses: 1) Non-governmental Organizations have not been
a central element in the NBI policy decisions, and 2) Pluralist structures lead to greater stakeholder
involvement.
Data Collection
The sample population consisted of nongovernmental stakeholders (NGOs) in Ethiopia who
were either involved or had interest in the decision-making processes of the Nile Basin Initiative.
A comprehensive list and contacts of all registered NGOs in Ethiopia was obtained from
Christian Relief and Development Association, an umbrella organization for registered NGOs in
Ethiopia. A similar list was obtained from the NBI headquarters in Uganda. Other sources included
published documents, email inquiries, and electronic copies of newsletters. The next step involved
the recruitment of key informants from the list.
The Reputational Approach was used to identify the key informants. The approach first
involved the engagement of a particular panel of informants (or ―judges‖) to identify who the
informants should be. This approach was initially applied by Floyd Hunter (1963) in his study of
community power structures and has subsequently been used in similar studies (Lineberry and
Sharkansky 1971). It is premised on the assumption that a cautiously selected panel of informants
will be familiar with individuals who are influential and those who are not (McCool 1995). As
applied in this article, this approach involved three steps. First, a basic list of 20 influential officials
of the NBI in Entebbe, Uganda (i.e., Secretariat headquarters) and another 40 NGO officials in
Ethiopia were developed. Second, a ―short list‖ of a panel of judges was put together. The panel,
consisting of five (n = 5) in each country, involved individuals of authority as determined by their
positions within the community or organizations. It was assumed that leaders of governmental
institutions have power, influence, keep good records, and have the knowledge of what is going on in
the community (Lineberry and Sharkansky 1971). The nomination of the judges was also based on
101
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the willingness to serve on the panel. It was obvious that those who made the final list held top
positions in the NBI Secretariat in Uganda, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office in Addis
Ababa, and from selected NGOs in Ethiopia.
The third step involved asking the judges to independently identify 10 individuals out of 20
perceived to have ―power‖ and ―influence‖ over NBI issues. The same process was repeated in
Ethiopia except were asked to identify 20 out of 40 on the list. According to Clelland and Form
(1968, 83), one‘s degree of influence can be assessed by her role in ―a number of community issues
or projects.‖ In a study of New Haven, Connecticut, Dahl (1961) applied the same concept of
―relative influence‖ to identify leaders who had more influence than others in the community. The
approach has been replicated in later studies (Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Wildavsky 1964).
To assist the panel of judges with their selection of key informants, the following instruction used by
Hunter (1963, 258), albeit tailored to this research, was replicated:
Suppose a major project were before a community or organization, one that required a
decision by a group of leaders whom nearly everyone would accept. Which 10 people out of
this list of 20 would you choose to make up this group regardless of whether or not you know
them personally? Please include any other person who you think should be on the list and the
reasons why. Next, rank order. The judges were verbally requested not to share their choices
with others.
Once the process was complete, the lists were tallied. Only individuals with most nominations were
selected to serve as key informants. Consequently, a total of 30 key (Uganda, 10; Ethiopia, 20)
informants were interviewed face-to-face using open-ended questions. The Uganda-based informants
were mainly members of the NBI Secretariat. The interviews with Secretariat officials focused
mainly on the history of involvement as well as the framework used to engage stakeholders.
Archival data, including memos and meeting records, were examined to determine the trend of
involvement by relevant actors. In Ethiopia, the interviewees consisted of NGO officials, with
additional representatives of the NBI, and other international organizations. All were based in the
capital, Addis Ababa. The objective was to know in which decision stages, if any, they have been
involved, and the reasons for noninvolvement in others.
Data Analysis
An inductive process was used to analyze the qualitative data. First, the interviews were
transcribed, followed by the development of a codebook to help organize the data into ‗chunks‘ or
categories. Second, the unstructured data were downloaded into Software for Qualitative Research
(QSR NVivo7) for further synthesis and identification of emerging themes. Third, claims about the
relationships among the emerging themes were made.
Findings
The findings in relation to each of the research questions are summarized below.
1. What are the characteristics of the power structures of the Nile Basin initiative as they relate
to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia?
102
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Evidence from the interviews and archival data showed that the NBI in Ethiopia is characterized by
two power structures: decentralized and centralized. On the one hand, the NBI‘s Shared Vision and
Subsidiary programs are decentralized at the regional, national and local levels. The purpose is to
bring the NBI project activities closer to the stakeholders. To some extent, they have enhanced
awareness and stakeholder involvement. For example, about two-dozen community- based
organizations have benefited from micro-grant projects funded by the NBI, including
involvement in project identification, and to some degree, in the monitoring and evaluation
activities. However, such level of involvement was found to be missing in the Water Resources
Planning and Management Project (WRPMP) — the issue-area investigated in this study.
On the other hand, the actual exercise of decision-making was found to be highly
centralized. This was the dominant view of the informants in Uganda and Ethiopia. As a senior
NBI official confirmed, ―We are more inclined to a centralized decision-making with all
sincerity… If you look at projects supported by UNOPS, the decision[s] [are] still centered with
the project managers. If you look at the organs like Technical Advisory Committees … the level
of openness here is still low.‖ Another informant in Uganda observed that ―It is still a very
government thing. It is a bureaucratic kind of institution. If the Nile Council of Ministers
doesn‘t say ABCD, then ABCD won‘t be done…‖ Moreover, the decisions affecting project
identification, alternative solutions, program implementation, monitoring and evaluation relative
to the WRPMP were highly centralized. It was further noted that only the project and designated
government officials were involved in the process; NGOs were invited only as observers.
2. For those not involved in the decision-making process, what constraints prevent them
from getting a „seat at the table‟?
Politics was the most important constraint to involvement. In particular, the NGOs decried the
lack of political space and support. The delay in the registration process, as in the case of the
Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse, further inhibited their ability to engage in the decision-making
processes. Besides, the NBI officials claimed that decision-making was solely a government
prerogative. As one senior NBI official stated, ―When you talk about government, this is high
level. We have ministers, the technical committee and the secretariat. We cannot invite NGOs to
the management meetings of the secretariat. There is no way.‖ NGOs were viewed by the NBI
officials as confrontational and hence treated as enemies rather than as allies. This has further
strained the relations between the NGOs and NBI officials.
Another constraint was lack of capacity among the NGOs. First, the channels of
information sharing with the civil society were found to be limited. The NBI‘s apparent faith in
its website as a means of keeping the stakeholders informed was considered inappropriate
because rural-based NGOs in Ethiopia did not have internet access. Additionally, some of the
NGOs located in Addis Ababa, the capital city, lacked the resources for internet access.
Similarly, most of the information distributed by the NBI was considered too technical and not
user-friendly. In order to address this problem, the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action
Project, for example, embarked on translating a NBI newsletter into the local Amharic language.
This has reportedly improved awareness about NBI activities among several NGOs. Inadequate
funding to the NGOs also weakened their capacity to attend NBI activities or to organize training
for their own staff.
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Additional problem was the location of the power structures and their characteristics. For
example, most of the NBI projects in Ethiopia were found to be concentrated in the capital city.
Therefore, NGOs outside of Addis Ababa must have the time and resources to travel great
distances to participate in the NBI decision processes if and when they are invited. Moreover, for
those who got invited involvement in the process was limited by the existing hierarchical
structure, decision rules, and their own lack of technical knowledge of the issues discussed.
Another related structural problem was the lack of involvement framework that is
inclusive of the stakeholders. Currently, the framework provides for direct involvement by
bureaucratic elites (NBI professionals), political elites (government officials), and noninstitutional professional elites (consultants, donors); see the concentric circles in Figure 2. Each
concentric circle represents a type of stakeholder. In the inner circle is the NBI Secretariat where
all the decision agendas are formulated and finalized. Closer to the NBI is the government that
consists of the Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM) and the Technical Advisory Committee
(Nile-TAC). Next are the donors and consultants. Outside that circle is the Nile Basin Discourse,
an umbrella organization presumed to represent the welfare of the NGOs with interest in the NBI
affairs.

Nile Basin Discourse (NBD)
Donors/Consultants
NGO Networks

NBI
Government

Figure 2: Current Involvement Framework
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On the outermost circle is the NGO network with interests in the Nile. Thus the nearer one is to
the NBI Secretariat the more likely direct involvement in the decision-making is guaranteed. The
converse is also true. The further out one is the less likely involvement is assured.
3. Do the power structure characteristics in Ethiopia relate to pluralism and, if so, how?
In order to answer this question, the following framework initially applied by Wildavsky
(Hawley and Wirt 1968), albeit tailored to this study, was adopted: a) If it is found that the same
group, the NBI, the power elites or the NGOs, exercise direct influence in most or all the
decision-making processes of the WRPMP‘s project components, then it can be concluded that
power elite structure exists; b) If involvement overlaps and varies from issue to issue, and from
one decision process to another, then it can be inferred that a pluralist structure exists. According
to Wildavsky (Hawley 1968) and Dahl (1961), this conclusion is arrived at when no one group
dominates influence in all decision-making areas.
Based on the above analytical criteria, two diametrically opposed power structure
characteristics were evident. First, a centralized (or elitist) structure was found to exist given the
fact that the NBI and its affiliated elites dominate most of the decision-making processes. As
two officials of the NBI Secretariat and the WRPMP affirmed, ―On the Policy, Good Practices
and Support component of the project, the formulation has been to a large extent done by
professionals… We principally work with the government. I don‘t think we have realized the
benefits of what we are doing until NGOs get involved.‖ Second, some involvement overlap was
evident at the implementation stage, especially for the Water Resources Planning component at
the local levels. Other decision stages such as program formulation, finding alternatives, and
evaluation are dominated by the elites (i.e., consultants, bureaucrats, and government officials).
This overlap, although somewhat limited, is evidence of a pluralist structure.
The existence of centralized/elitist structures alongside pluralist ones brings to the fore a
contradiction between structures and functions. On the one hand, Ethiopia‘s federal constitution
mandates pluralist structures that allow organized groups to form and operate. On the other hand,
the functions of these structures are restricted either by mandates of the same government or by
bureaucratic inertia. The irony of this trajectory is that the expectations for involvement are laid
down by the structures but in practice they function differently, thereby limiting NGO
involvement.
4. To what extent are conditions in Ethiopia compatible with the prerequisites of
pluralism?
Information about whether conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with the prerequisites of
pluralism was obtained from the literature, but some additional comments from the key
informants also were considered in this regard. Generally, and as reported earlier in this article, a
democratic pluralist society should, at the minimum, have the following attributes: decentralized
power structures, diversified and heterogeneous population; diversified economy; reasonable
level of industrialization; strong labor unions; large-sized and autonomous NGOs; competitive
party politics; involvement mechanisms; information accessibility; and, policy influence by
organized groups. The analyses of archival documents and responses by key informants show a
―strong‖ presence of decentralized power structures at the national level and heterogeneous
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population, and a ―weak presence‖ of the other attributes. A brief explanation follows.
Ethiopia‘s political structure is federal, with nine autonomous Regional States (United
Nations Public Administration Network 2008). This means that the nine regional states make
independent decisions and at same time have equal representation in the Federal government.
The country is heterogeneous in nature, with seventy-three ethnic groups that speak different
languages, practice different religions, and have the right to engage in different forms of
economic activities. The population was estimated at 79 million (World Health Organization
2009) at the time of this study was conducted. In addition, organized groups can form and
operate as nongovernmental organizations. Although labor unions and NGOs form, their size and
freedom of operation were restricted. As one of the informants in Ethiopia stated, ―I don‘t know
if labor unions are active at all in this country. They are at the margin. The regional unions, the
teacher unions, and others don‘t have much weight here.‖ Thus, even though diffused power
structures are present in Ethiopia, NGOs and labor unions do not have the latitude to use them
freely. This undermines competition and bargaining which are key elements of a wellfunctioning pluralistic society. Evidence further indicates that the government of Ethiopia is
restrictive and distrustful of organized groups. This hostile treatment of organized groups has
historical precedence and continues without adequate checks and balances. For example, under
the imperial regime of Haile Sellasie operations of NGOs were very much restricted (Klare
2001); the restriction continued with Presidents Haile Mariam Mengistu and Meles Zenawi
according to the Key Informant testimonies availed to the researcher.
The latest litmus test of the willingness to widen space for organized groups in Ethiopia
can be seen through the passage of the ‗Charities and Societies Proclamation, No. 00/2008‘ in
January 2009. Section 1, Article 2, of that law stipulates that a locally registered NGO shall not
receive more than 10 percent of its annual funding from outside sources. Given that the majority
of NGO receive over 90 percent of their funding from external sources, this law will limit their
capacity to operate and build effective partnerships to mobilize resources, and reduce incentives
to organize and assemble. One NGO affected by this mandate, which works with the NBI to
implement projects, is the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum (EtNBDF).The EtNBDF
founded in 2005 and it receives most of its funding from external sources (Technical Analysis of
Second Draft Proclamation 2008).
Section 7, Article 93, Sub Article 1 of the law states that a federal body has the right to
suspend, remove and replace an NGO officer (Technical Analysis of Second Draft of
Proclamation 2008). This undermines the autonomy of civic organizations, and potentially opens
doors for abuse by the supervising federal agency. As noted earlier, autonomy is one of the
prerequisites of pluralism within a democracy. Section 10, Article 107, of that legislation further
declares that any person who prints, publishes, displays, sells or exposes for sale, or transmits
information through the post or any electronic media, in the interests of any ―unlawful charity‖
or society shall be punishable with a fine not less than Birr 3,000 (US $166 at September 2012
Exchange Rate) and not exceeding Birr 5,000 (US $277) and by a simple imprisonment of not
less than three years and not exceeding five years, provided the criminal code does not prescribe
a more severe penalty. As defined by the legislation, unlawful organizations include unregistered
NGOs. In this respect, the Ethiopian Nile Basin Discourse Forum—not registered since its
founding in 2005 but continues to work with the Nile Basin Initiative on outreach and
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implementation of community-based investment projects—stands to be victimized.
In light of the legislation, a senior NBI official in Ethiopia commented that, ―The
government wishes to control NGOs, particularly those whose areas of operation include human
rights and governance… At the core, government wants to be sure that these NGOs receiving
external funding are not spies… Civil society is perceived as a problem; it is better to deal with
them by the book.‖
Discussion
According to Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), pluralism has three potential benefits: the ability to
unite the efforts of unlike minds; the creation of points of action and action strategies through the
power of meetings; and enabling the actors to select representatives to influence public policy.
How then do the pluralist power structures within the NBI‘s WRPM project in Ethiopia measure
up to the Tocquevillean ideals? On the ability to unite unlike minds, the study informants argued
that this is unlikely until an official arrangement such as memorandum of understanding between
the NGOs and the NBI is formalized. Even then, it will take overhauling of the individual
attitudes within the NBI and the political leadership of Ethiopia to make that possible. At the
time of this study, the government of Melles Zenawi was mentioned by the participants as hostile
to NGOs. Similarly, the NBI officials were accused of being manipulative and evasive instead of
being receptive to organized groups.
On the second criteria, or the creation of points of action in which the nongovernmental
stakeholders could come together with the NBI officials to discuss policy issues and to make
joint decisions, several power structures at the national level have been instituted. The problem
however is that these structures are basically centered at the capital city, Addis Ababa. With lack
of financial resources, it is not possible for rural-based NGOs to participate actively. Moreover,
as noted in the findings, those power structures are meaningless when NGO representatives are
invited only as observers. On third criteria, representation was found to be limited to the
leadership of the Nile Basin Discourse, an umbrella body for all NGOs in the Nile Basin
countries.
Generally in Ethiopia, the prerequisites of pluralism do exist as evident in the findings.
However, internal pluralism is simply a style of government. But because the NBI is an
extension of government within Ethiopia‘s power structure, the question that must be asked is,
―whose interests are being represented?‖ In the pluralist view, right now only the interests of
government leadership are being considered as the evidence presented by the informants clearly
attest. Similarly, the viability of Ethiopia‘s pluralist structures is further put to test by the new
legislation that disenfranchises NGOs with a real stake in the NBI‘s national projects. The socalled Charities and Societies Proclamation law potentially restricts plural power structures in
Ethiopia, and thus limits the ability of interest groups to organize internally and consequently
crippling the NBI and NGO functions. As several scholars, cited earlier, have found in their
research of community power structures, an open and equitable access to decision-making by
nongovernmental stakeholders can increase the chances of achieving community program goals.
But achieving such equity requires a democratic system of public management that promotes and
ensures representation of all those who have a stake in a public issue. Unfortunately, for the NBI
it is a Catch-22. On the one hand, it is possible to democratize involvement procedures. On the
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other hand, those procedures can be prevented from use by an authoritarian government that
deems openness as a threat to the status quo. This is exactly what was observed of Ethiopia
during and after the field research. Ethiopia was then under President Zenawi whom research
informants accused of heavy-handedness in his leadership style.
Equity is even more difficult when NGOs are viewed with suspicion by the sitting
government. Consequently, this kind of political atmosphere makes it daunting for the NBI to
implement democratic values within its power structure. As one participant in Ethiopia
acknowledged, the political environment instills some fear in the officials of the WRPMP hence
the strategies that they adopt, including the engagement of stakeholders, must often avoid
confrontation with the government.
Substantively, pluralism is a procedural theory concerned with the decision-making
processes and how they work. It is not enough for a government or a public agency to declare
that it has met the pluralist requirement by simply establishing laws that allow groups to form.
Certainly, there is a difference between structures and functions. On the converse, there are
certain similarities in the way pluralism is defined and structured. But the operationalization of
those structures, as this study shows, can be influenced by contextual variables such as past
history of involvement, the nature of NGO-government relationships, and the attitudes of water
agency officials toward NGOs as the case the NBI in Ethiopia has shown.
Nonetheless, given that the NBI is an international body with diplomatic privileges, it
seems reasonable to expect the officials to intervene directly or indirectly on behalf of its
national institutions or other organized groups, if expected outcomes of the funded projects are to
be achieved. Therefore, enhanced involvement in the WRPMP components will be dependent, to
a large extent, not on the question of institutional efficiency but on the practical application of
equity, fairness, and democratic openness. These observations thus lead this study to hypothesize
that there is a relationship between the exercise of pluralism and the degree of democratic
openness that exists among the political leadership at any given time, whether in pluralist or
centralized/elitist system.
Recommendations
This study has reported some of the challenges facing NGOs with interest in the affairs of the
Nile waters in Ethiopia. Apart from the desire for more funding and training opportunities, one
issue repeated by the informants was the wish to actively get involved in the decision-making
processes of the NBI. It is true that the power structures in Ethiopia are pluralist in nature, but the
functionality of those structures is limited to political controls. At the NBI level, the power
structures are similarly diffused, with project offices spread throughout the basin countries.
However in Ethiopia, the project offices are concentrated in the capital city, hierarchical, and
engage selected NGO representatives only as observers.
It is therefore recommended that the presence of power structures must be complimented
with an inclusive framework that defines the responsibilities of each of the actors (i.e., NBI
officials, policy makers, consultants, and NGOs). Figure 3 shows the link between the current
and the recommended framework. The concentric circles to the left show the current
involvement structure in which the NBI officials and those closer to the inner circle have the
involvement structure in which the NBI officials and those closer to the inner circle have the
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privilege to participate in the decisions made by the water agency. In other words, one‘s chance
to get involved in the decision-making process is enhanced by the proximity to the inner circle.
That framework thus leaves the NGOs at the margin of decision-making. An ideal structure is
depicted by the concentric circles to the right in which all the actors are equidistant to the
decision-making table, and thus jointly contribute to the process.

Current Framework

Preferred Framework
Government

NBD

GOVT.

NBI

DONOR

NBI
NGO Networks

NGOs

Donors/Consultants

Figure 3: Circle of Involvement—Inclusion Model

Conclusion
The goal of this study was to assess whether the presence or absence of pluralist structures
explains the missing involvement by nongovernmental organizations in the decision-making
processes of Ethiopia‘s NBI project. That assessment was driven by two hypotheses: One,
nongovernmental organizations have not been a central element in the NBI decision-making;
two, pluralist structures lead to greater involvement by stakeholders. The following conclusions
are made with respect to the research questions, stated earlier in the article, and the two
hypotheses.
With respect to the first research question, ―What are the characteristics of the power
structures of the Nile Basin Initiative as they relate to stakeholder involvement in Ethiopia?‖, the
study concludes that the existence of contradictory power structures, pluralist and elitist, do not make
it any easier for stakeholders to get involved in decisions. This is because the elitist power structures
privilege those at the top with decision powers, while the pluralist structures serve as instruments of
political window dressing. Consequently, NGO representatives are invited only as observers and not
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as active participants.
As to what constraints prevent NGOs from getting a ‗seat at the table‘, this study
concludes that politics is at the top of the list of deterrents. With Ethiopia‘s NGOs viewed with
suspicion and hostility by the government, it is often difficult to bring the two actors to the table.
The limited space thus provided only allow for observers with no significant influence.
Moreover, the government views decision-making as her prerogative. As one NBI senior official
quipped: ―We cannot invite NGOs to the management meetings, there is no way.‖ To further
constrict the political space, Ethiopia‘s government has, under the immediate past President
Meles Zenawi, made it bureaucratically difficult for organized groups to get registered, in
addition to the passage of a 2008 law that demarcates between a regular NGO or ―a foreign
agent‖ based on the sources of funding. This kind of approach to dealing with NGOs as enemies
and not as allies, whether in pluralist or elitist structures, defeats the purpose of collective
responsibility in the management shared water resources.
As to whether pluralist structures in Ethiopia relate to pluralism, evidence supports the
conclusion that while the constitution and national government structures mandate pluralism, the
functions of those structures are guarded by political and bureaucratic elites through noninclusive rules and procedures. The irony of this trajectory is that the expectations for
involvement are laid down by the structure but in practice function differently, thereby limiting
involvement. And whether the conditions in Ethiopia are compatible with prerequisites of
pluralism, evidence support the inference that internal pluralism is simply a style of government.
But because the NBI is an extension of government within Ethiopia‘s power structure, the
question that must be asked is, ―whose interests are being represented?‖ In the pluralist view,
right now only the interests of government leadership are being considered.
Do the results of this study support the hypotheses? The premise that NGOs have not
been a central element in the NBI decision-making processes is validated by the informant data.
However, the study does not confirm the second hypothesis that pluralism leads to greater
involvement. As stated at the beginning of this article, pluralism as a theoretical framework has
been previously employed, at least by Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960), Robert Dahl
(1961), Floyd Hunter (1963), and Aaron Wildavsky (1964), to successfully determine the
positive relationship between pluralist structures and enhanced stakeholder involvement.
However, as the case of Ethiopia illustrates, the efficacy of pluralist structures as the mechanism
for enhanced stakeholder involvement requires more than the constitution or the rules and
procedures. Instead, such level of involvement is influenced by contextual variables such as past
history of involvement, the nature of NGO-government relationships, and the attitudes of water
agency officials toward the NGOs.
Therefore two important implications of this study to research and water governance can
be drawn. First is the misplaced body of literature that situates pluralism at the core of enhanced
universal stakeholder involvement. Substantively, pluralism is a procedural theory concerned
with the decision-making processes and how they work. Therefore it is insufficient for a
government or a public agency to declare that it has met the pluralist requirement by simply
establishing laws that allow groups to form. Additionally, the creation of pluralist structures does
not by itself guarantee stakeholder involvement. Instead, what is critical is the access to the ‗seat
at the table‘ that those structures provide. In the NBI situation where bureaucratic inertia and
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heavy political handedness are the norm, democratic openness, simplified rules for participation,
and incentives such as information availability, funding, and capacity building can remedy the
dismal levels of involvement Another study outcome that can contribute to involvement is the
change of attitude towards NGOs. Development, and in particular the management of shared
water resources, requires collective action. Therefore the water agency officials should work
with NGOs as partners rather than view them with suspicion and as enemies. Moreover, it is not
sufficient to invite NGO representatives as observers to the decision-making processes. The
unintended consequence of the observer status is the increased level of mistrust and the omission
of invaluable input from the grassroots level that have the potential to improve decision
outcomes.
Lastly, there were two limitations to this study. The qualitative approach to the collection
and analysis of data, while useful, narrowed the depth of analysis as well as the results that a
survey approach would have produced. For example, the results of a survey data would have
made it possible to determine the statistical significance of ―politics‖ as the top constraint to
involvement vis-à-vis other impediments. Another limitation was the application of westernbased prerequisites and indicators of pluralism in a developing country context. Such ―foreign‖
lenses, when used in a country such as Ethiopia, have the potential to skew the reality on the
ground. These limitations can form the basis for future research.
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